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I. Introduction
This article reviews some of the major developments during the year 2005 within the
field of International Criminal Law, particularly developments relating to the Iraqi Special
Tribunal (IST) for Saddam Hussein, now renamed the Iraqi High Criminal Court (IHCC),'
and the International Criminal Court (ICC). Due to space limitations, these developments
have been selected both because they are recent (little or no information about them ap-
peared in the Year in Review for 2004), and because they are thematically important with
respect to the rule of law. Omission of a particular subject, therefore, is not intended to
imply that the subject lacked significance, or that it does not belong in a discussion of
International Criminal Law.
II. Iraqi Special Tribunal for Saddam Hussein
On October 18, 2005, the Iraqi Special Tribunal began its first trial of Saddam Hussein
and seven co-defendants in connection with the execution of nearly 150 men and teenage
boys in Dujail, a mostly Shiite market town, thirty-five miles north of Baghdad. In 1982,
secret police carried out the executions in response to an assassination attempt against
Hussein. All of the defendants have pleaded not guilty.' According to Iraqi officials, they
chose to try Hussein first with the Dujail case because it would be relatively straightforward
to prosecute. The case involves a series of well-documented events, from the assassination
attempt through the death sentences and executions at Abu Ghraib prison.' On January 17,
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2006, Saeed al-Hameesh was appointed to replace Rizgar Mohammed Amin, as head of the
five-judge panel overseeing the trial.4 Mr. Amin resigned after he became irate with criticism
that he had allowed proceedings to spin out of control.' Rizgar Mohammed Amin, an ethnic
Kurd from the northern city of Sulaymniyah, heads the five-judge panel overseeing the
trial.6 The current trial is expected to be the first of approximately one dozen involving
Hussein. These trials will include the alleged killing of Kurds in the 1988 Anfal operations,
the gassing of civilians in the town of Halabja, and the repression of the 1991 Shia intifada.
The stakes for Hussein's first trial range well beyond a successful conviction. The conduct
of the trial has important implications for stability in Iraq, and law and accountability in
the wider Middle East. The conflicting motives behind the trial, however, may undermine
the process. These motives include a desire for punishment by Hussein's Iraqi victims and,
as a related point, the need for some measure of reconciliation and deterrence of other
political leaders who ignore human rights. In addition, coalition forces could use a convic-
tion to lend some legitimacy to their pre-emptive strike.8
The IST already has had several problems. While it appears that Americans working in
the Regime Crimes Liaison Office, which helps prepare for the trial, have resisted political
influence, senior tribunal officials have admitted, speaking on conditions of anonymity, that
they acceded to Iraqi government pressure to start the Dujail case. 9 In addition, interna-
tional human rights organizations have heavily criticized the case, warning that it may not
meet international standards.' 0 They have cited the following problems with the tribunal
and its statute: (1) no requirement to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; (2) inadequate
protections for the accused to present a defense on conditions equal to those enjoyed by
the prosecution; (3) disputes among Iraqi political factions over control of the court, jeop-
ardizing its appearance of impartiality; and (4) a draconian requirement that prohibits com-
mutation of death sentences by any Iraqi official, including the president, and compels the
execution of the defendant within thirty days of a final judgment."
Further problems include that in July 2005, nine administrative officers were dismissed
under a mostly un-enforced tribunal provision that forbids former Baath Party members
from working as an investigator, prosecutor, or judge."2 Moreover, Iraqi leaders have ap-
pointed and dismissed a succession of tribunal officials in the past fifteen months, including
three men who served as the tribunal's administrative director."3 Finally, the resignation of
the Chief Judge has added to the difficulties.
In addition, Hussein's lawyers have complained that they received the bulk of their evi-
dence only the month before the trial began. According to experts close to the legal team,
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the witnesses' names in the dossier were excised, preventing the defense from contacting
them to investigate the validity of their statements.'4 Due to the lack of time to study the
evidence, Khalil al-Dulaimi, Hussein's counsel, requested and received an adjournment of
the trial until November 28, 2005. AI-Dulaimi also accused government officials of making
statements that prejudiced the trial. 5
These problems increased when, on October 20, 2005, a dozen armed men seized Sadoun
al-Janabi, a defense lawyer for Awad Hamed al-Bander, the former head of the Revolution-
ary Court under Hussein. The men then executed al-Janabi, shooting him in the head and
tossing his body in a lot. The killing occurred less than thirty-six hours after Hussein's trial
started, where al-Janabi was identified by name, and his photograph shown while presenting
arguments in the court.1
6
On October 25, 2005, defense counsel in the Hussein case ended their participation in
the work of the Iraqi court hearing cases about mass killings under Hussein's rule. The
counsel demanded that the Iraqi government provide them with fifteen bodyguards each,
a level of protection that is at least equal to the security provided to top Iraqi cabinet
ministers and U.S. officials in Iraq. 7 Court officials said after the murder of al-Janabi that
they were ready to provide substantial protection to the defense counsel.
Khamis al-Beidi, one of three lawyers who represented Hussein, said in an interview that
due to the present security conditions in Iraq, his client's best interests were served by the
lawyers suspending their participation in the trial because they cannot move freely, let alone
undertake the kind of legal preparations required to defend their client." AI-Beidi's position
seemed to be reinforced when, on November 8, 2005, Adel al-Zubeidi, a lawyer for former
Iraqi Vice-President Taha Yassin Ramadan and a co-defendant in Hussein's trial, was mur-
dered. Another attorney associated with the defense of Saddam and other ousted Iraqi
officials was wounded in the attack. 1
Meanwhile, the Iraqi Bar Association has called for an end to any involvement with the
court after al-Janabi's murder. Furthermore, on October 26, 2005, counsel for defendants
in the Hussein case repeated claims that the rights of Hussein and seven co-defendants
were violated in the first of the trials before the court, making a "fair and transparent trial
impossible."20
The controversy was even further complicated when, on October 23, 2005, the five-
judge panel in the first case, notwithstanding the forty-day recess, took testimony from a
former secret police official who is near death from lung cancer in a U.S. military detention
center close to Baghdad. According to court officials, the witness, Waddad al-Sheikh, in his
late fifties or early sixties, was questioned in a clinic while attached to oxygen equipment
and an intravenous drip. He was not represented by counsel and no defense counsel were
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present.2' Court officials identified Sheikh as the chief interrogator of the men and teenage
boys who were put to death after the assassination attempt in Dujail. According to officials,
Sheikh, an official of the Mukhabarat secret police agency, was in charge of the interro-
gations that led to the torture deaths of forty-six of the victims before they were formally
sentenced to death by a revolutionary court. Former chief Judge Rizgar Mohammed Amin
explained the need to question Sheikh by saying during the recess of formal proceedings
on October 18, 2005 that Sheikh might not survive long enough to appear as a witness
when proceedings resume, especially since he needs oxygen to help him with breathing,
even when he is asleep.2 The Iraqi court's practice of taking evidence from defendants in
the absence of attorneys became an issue almost as soon as the court was established last
year. Iraqi investigative judges questioned Hussein and several of his top associates on
numerous occasions before they met for the first time with their counsel.23
The suspension of participation by defense counsel (not to mention their assassinations)
and the questioning of Sheikh and Hussein without the presence of counsel, notwithstand-
ing the justifications, give pause for concern about the fairness of the trial. The effort by
the court to adjudicate cases against Hussein and other former high-level officials of the
Hussein regime raises important issues, the most important of which is whether the defen-
dants can obtain a fair trial in the unique circumstances. The Hussein trial faces a number
of obstacles, including: (1) the difficult security surrounding the trial and the refusal of
defense counsel to participate;24 (2) head-of-state immunity;2" (3) the fact that the IST arose
during the occupation of the coalition forces; (4) the highly politicized developments sur-
rounding the judges and prosecutors in the IST; (5) the televising of the proceedings; and
lastly (6) the refusal of the United Nations (U.N.) and much of the international community
to participate due to the potential use of the death penalty in the case. The political im-
portance of the trial for the new Iraqi government and its U.S. coalition interlocutors is
significant as well since a principal justification for the invasion of Iraq was to bring law
and order and democracy. Still another issue is whether ad hoc tribunals are the best means
to adjudicate such cases, especially now that the ICC is available. Indeed, the IST and the
trial of Hussein and his associates will be a veritable classroom of international humanitarian
law.
M. The International Criminal Court
When the IST began its proceedings, the ICC, another fledgling tribunal, already had
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international treaty establishing the ICC, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court,2 6 did not increase from 2004, but three more countries ratified the treaty increasing
the total from 97 to 100, and civil society campaigns to increase this number are ongoing.
7
Moreover, in addition to other seminal developments, such as the Court's issuance of its
first arrest warrants,2" the ICC received the first case referred to its jurisdiction by the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), an event of manifest significance in the ICC's
early development. The ICC, however, has been the subject of substantial controversy from
some national governments, particularly Sudan and the United States, which have contin-
ued to oppose the Court as a universal international criminal tribunal. 9
The UNSC adopted a crucial resolution to the Court on March 31, 2005, known as
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1593 (UNSCR 1593).3o The resolution referred to the
ICC what was undoubtedly only a small fraction of the atrocities committed recently in the
Darfur region of Sudan." Thereafter, acting pursuant to the recommendation of the U.N.
Commission of Inquiry, which had just completed its investigation into Darfur and events
there,32 the U.N. Secretary-General transmitted the names of fifty-one individuals sus-
pected of war crimes and crimes against humanity33 to the ICC prosecutor, Luis Moreno
Ocampo, who announced his investigation of these crimes on June 6, 2005.14 The investi-
gation, as of this writing, is ongoing, although it appears that substantial evidence of the
26. The Rome Statute was signed on July 17, 2998, but entered into force on July 1, 2002. The ICC,
therefore, has jurisdiction only over crimes committed after July 1, 2002. See Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
27. See generally The American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for the International Criminal
Court (AMICC), http://www.amicc.org (last visited Feb. 13, 2006); and The Coalition for the International
Criminal Court, http://www.iccnow.org (last visited Feb. 13, 2006).
28. The warrants were issued for five individuals in connection with the activities of the so-called Lord's
Resistance Army in Uganda. The crimes alleged in the warrants include both war crimes and crimes against
humanity for such acts as "rape, murder, enslavement, sexual enslavement and forced enlisting of children."
International Criminal Court, Statement by the Chief Prosecutor on the Uganda Arrest Warrants (Oct. 14,
2005), http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/speeches/LMO-20051014-English.pdf. For more informa-
tion on the Ugandan conflict, see International Criminal Court, Situation in Uganda, Documents, http://
www.icc-cpi.int/cases/current-situations/Uganda/ug-doc.html(last visited Feb. 13, 2006).
29. See, e.g., Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, Richard Boucher, Spokesman (Apr. 1, 2005),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2005/44132.htm; see also Opheera McDoom, Sudan Rebels Welcome U.N.
Darfur Crimes Rerral, SUDAN TRIBUNE, Apr. 1, 2005, http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id -article
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Darfur.pdf; see also S.C. Res. 1564, UN Doc S/Res/1564 (Sept. 18, 2004) (UNSC Resolution authorizing the
Commission's investigation).
33. The substantive crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction are genocide war crimes, crimes against humanity,
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suspected atrocities has already been obtained and compiled by the Office of the Prosecutor
(OTP) and by non-governmental organizations."
UNSCR 1593 raised controversial issues, as is evident from the public reactions of the
various immediately interested parties. Indeed, at the same time that the two major rebel
organizations in Sudan were welcoming the Darfur referral as "a big day for justice" and
as an event that would encourage peace negotiations, the Sudanese government was just as
quickly denouncing it, arguing stridently that the resolution lacked "any basis for justice
and objectivity" and that it violated "the principle of national sovereignty." 6
That an accused would argue the latter was only to be expected; however, it could not
be overlooked that senior U.S. officials within the Bush administration were already on the
record as having lodged similar complaints, particularly regarding the possibility that the
ICC would bring politically motivated prosecutions." Thus, at the inception of the ICC's
activity, its very legitimacy was subject to substantial opposition.
In view of this dispute, which is no less than fundamental, a brief examination is warranted
of the jurisdictional scheme pursuant to which the ICC may exercise valid authority over
the crimes that the Court was intended to prosecute. First, the ICC is in compliance with
the generally accepted international legal principle that states party to an international
treaty (such as the Rome Statute) submit themselves to the ICC's jurisdiction. 8 Articles 13
through 15 of the Rome Statute specifically prescribe three methods by means of which
the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over a substantive crime: either (1) a crime may be re-
ferred to the ICC prosecutor by a state party to the Rome Statute; (2) a crime may be
referred by the UNSC, acting pursuant to chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter; or (3) the ICC
prosecutor may initiate an investigation proprio mofm, subject to the approval of the Court's
Pre-Trial Chamber. Of these, understandably controversial is the second method, the ability
of the UNSC to refer a crime to the ICC for prosecutorial action regardless of whether
35. See AMICC Current Investigation, supra note 31; ICC, REPORT OF THE PROSECUTOR OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, MR. Luis MORENO OCAMPO, TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL PURSUANT TO UNSCR 1593
(2005), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC_-Darfur-_UNSC_Report-_29-06-05_- EN.pdf.
The Office of the Prosecutor is one of the Court's several components. For more information about the
structure of the ICC, see ICC, How Does the Court Work?, http://www.icc-cpi.int/about/ataglance/howdoes
thecourtwork.honl (last visited Feb. 13, 2006).
36. McDoom, Sudan Rebels, supra note 29; Darfur War Crimes Vote 'Unjust', BBC NEws, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/africa/4402073.stn (last visited Feb. 13, 2006). The Associated Press recently reported that the
Sudanese government has shown some willingness to cooperate with the ICC, though only with respect to the
arrest of Joseph Kony, one of the top five members of the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army, against whom
the ICC has issued an indictment.
37. White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan, speaking in regard to the Darfur resolution, stated that
the reason we didn't stand in the way of that resolution was for two reasons. One, we believe strongly
that people need to be held accountable for the atrocities committed. Two, it provides protections for
Americans in that resolution.
We've expressed our concerns about the International Criminal Court and how it could be used for
political prosecutions. That view remains the same. But this resolution included some protections that
addressed our concerns.
Press Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House Spokesperson (Apr. 1, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2005/04/20050401-8.hunl#1 1.
38. Sudan became a signatory to the Rome Statute on September 8, 2000, but the government still has not
submitted its ratification. See Rome Statute, supra note 26.
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the particular state thereby placed within the purview of investigation has consented to the
exercise of the Court's authority. 9
The progenitors of the Court were mindful that the ICC might be perceived as infringing
on national sovereignty.40 Thus, the Rome Statute embodies the principle of complemen-
tarity, whereby the Court refrains from investigating a crime until such time as it determines
that the particular nation having immediate jurisdiction proves unable or unwilling to pros-
ecute the suspected perpetrators. In the words of a policy paper issued by the Court in
September of 2003, "[t]he ICC is not intended to replace national courts, but to operate
when national structures and courts are unwilling or unable to conduct investigations and
prosecutions." 4' This principle is embodied in articles 17 and 19 of the Rome Statute, which
together prescribe a procedure for the ICC to assess specific cases to ensure their compat-
ibility with the goal of complementarity and also for states to challenge what may be termed
the Court's complementarity determination. In making this determination, article 17 man-
dates that certain considerations be taken into account, including whether the proceedings
are impartial, whether proceedings are being delayed too long to be regarded as genuine,
or whether they are being undertaken merely to shield those suspected of atrocities from
prosecution.
42
In response to UNSCR 1593, on June 13, 2005, the Sudanese government issued a
judicial decree that created a putative war crimes court, located in the northern city of El
Fasher, in order to try 160 Darfur-related suspects.43 In contrast to the Sudanese govern-
ment's prior vehement rejection of the Darfur referral, the Sudanese ambassador's subse-
quent conciliatory statements, regarding this court and its relationship to the ICC, made
clear the reality that the court was the product of the considerable international pressure
that UNSCR 1593 had placed.on the Sudanese government." In any event, in August 2005,
39. Id. at arts. 12-15.
40. See, e.g., Vincent Kirabokyamaria, Ambassador to Italy of the Republic of Uganda, Speech (June 18,
1998), http://www.un.org/icc/speeches/618uga.htm.
41. ICC-OTP, Paper On Some Policy Issues Before The Office Of The Prosecutor, (Sept. 2003), http://www.
icc-cpi.int/ibary/organs/otp/030905_PolicyPaper.pdf.
42. See Rome Statute, supra note 26, arts. 17, 19. The Court, moreover, is also to consider whether the
national court system in play is actually capable of conducting necessary proceedings. Article 19, in tandem,
provides methods for states or accused persons to challenge the Court's complementarity determination. Ul-
timately, however, the determination is the Court's. Id.
43. "The Specialised Tribunal for Darfur was established by decree no. 702, issued by chief justiceJalal-el-
Din Mohamed Osman, pursuant to [a]rticle 10 of the Judicial Council Act of 1986 and [a]rticle 6 and 14 of
the Criminal Procedure Act of 1991." REPORT OF THE PRosEcUTro OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
supra note 33, at 4 n.3.
44. On June 29, 2005, speaking in response to the prosecutor's report on the Darfur investigation to the
U.N. Security Council, the ambassador stated that
the new special court that has been set up, we believe it can handle [Darfir-related prosecutions] and
of course, I guess, according to the Statute of the ICC-they could monitor that and theycould decide
whether it doing [sic] this or not. I think this is where the ICC stands, and I believe this is the way
it is.
Press Release, International Criminal Court, Permanent Representatives of Sudan, Informal Remarks at the
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three men were convicted by this court on charges of waging war and each was sentenced
to five years in prison.4
5
Notwithstanding these events, in his report to the UNSC on June 29, 2005, Ocampo
wrote that the OTP, nevertheless, would "follow the work of the [Sudanese national] tri-
bunal in order to determine whether it is investigating, or has investigated or prosecuted,
the cases of relevance to the ICC, and whether any such proceedings meet the standards
of genuineness as defined by article 17 of the Rome Statute."4 U.N. officials, however,
were not so circumspect. Indeed, the U.N. Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide,
Juan Mendez, stated that the cases that were being considered by the Sudanese national
court in El Fasher did not deal with the major crimes committed during the Darfur con-
flict.4 7 Sima Samar, the U.N. special rapporteur for human rights in Sudan, voiced stronger
criticism, observing that even the court's own chief justice said that, of the 72,000 complaints
filed in Darfur, the court, as of October 2005, only had tried three cases.41
How this situation is resolved will be a development for the international legal com-
munity to follow. As David Crane, former Prosecutor for the Special Court in Sierra Leone,
noted, "[w]e have to get the ICC right" in light of growing international criticisms of the
ad hoc tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda, and the weariness with which much of the world has come to regard a suc-
cession of seemingly unrelenting atrocities, particularly in Africa. 49
Of course, the ongoing controversy regarding the ICC was not limited to the Court's
recent activity in Sudan. Since 2001, when the Bush administration took office, the U.S.
government notoriously has opposed the very existence of the ICC and has actively sought
to undermine the Court's ability to function. 0 In 2005, this opposition continued, chiefly
in the form of the administration's campaign to secure so-called bilateral immunity agree-
ments pursuant to article 98 of the Rome Statute, of which there are now reportedly 100.11
45. See Three Convicted by Sudan War Crimes Court, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 13, 2005; Court Jails Three
Soldiers Over Darfur Abuses, ANOLA PRESS, Aug. 15, 2005, http://www.angolapress-angop.ao/noticia-e.asp?ID
= 365770.
46. The prosecutor was expected to report again to the UNSC in December 2005. REPORT OF THR PROSE-
CUTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 33.
47. See United Nations Offiial Slams Darfur Crimes Court, REUTERS, Sept. 26, 2005, http://today.reuters.com/
News/CrisesArticle.aspx?storyID = MCD648353.htm.
48. See Opheera McDoom, Sudan Not Trying Darfur War Crimes-U.N. Official, REUTERS, Oct. 22, 2005,
http://today.reuters.com/News/CrisesArticle.aspx?storyld = MCD252251 .htm.
49. Michele Kelemen, ICC Readies First War-Crimes Indictments, Morning Edition (NPR Broadcast Oct. 5,
2005), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld = 4945975.
50. John Bolton, formerly U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security and
now U.S. ambassador to the U.N., has claimed to regard the unsigning of the Rome Statute by the United
States as the proudest day of his government service. See Ivo Daalder, The Bush Administration on Darfur-Less
Than Meets The Eye, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGEtSS, Apr. 5, 2005, http://www.americanprogress.org/site/
pp.asp?c = biJRJSOVF&b = 493109.
51. See Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Fact Sheet, Status of U.S. Bilateral ImmunityAgree-
ments, http://www.iccnow.org/pressroom/factsheets/BIAsByRegion-current.pdf(last visited Feb. 13, 2006). As
their name suggests, these agreements prevent states from turning over to the ICC any U.S. nationals within
the state's territory that signed the agreement. Some of the countries with which the United States has con-
cluded these agreements include Uganda, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan. Whether these agreements are actually
authorized by the Rome Statute is a matter of controversy. See AMICC, Bilateral ImmunityAgreements, http://
www.amicc.org/usinfo/administration-policy-BIAs.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2006); see also Nicolas Kristof,
Schoolyard Bully Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005;Juan Forero, Bush'Aid Cuts on Court lisue Roil Neighbors,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2005, at Al.
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It was argued by some commentators that the United States abstention from the vote on
UNSCR 1593 indicated a qualitative shift in the U.S. government's posture toward the
ICC."1 Other commentators, however, looked askance at paragraph 6 of UNSCR 1593 that
they maintained provided a virtual exemption for U.S. personnel from ICC jurisdiction-
exactly what the administration had always wanted."
IV International Criminal Court and the Rule of Law
Among the arguments on the basis of which the Bush administration has rejected the
ICC has been the claim that the Court may bring politically motivated and, therefore,
presumably groundless charges against U.S. leaders or military personnel "that may find
themselves subject to ICC jurisdiction even though the United States is not a party to the
Rome Statute." 4 In response, the Court's supporters, generally speaking, have observed
that the Court was created to prosecute only the most serious offenses known to humankind,
which would never be authorized as part of any U.S. military strategy, and that, in any
event, such prosecutions would be prevented from happening due to the practical political
considerations of states and the ICC's inescapable dependence on states' cooperation." In
2005, this argument continued, with profound implications for the rule of law that tran-
scends the immediate issue of the ICC's legitimacy, whether from the Sudanese or U.S.
government's perspective or any other.
The ICC's proponents in this argument, many of whom were experts in their fields,
showed themselves to be a bit disingenuous, sometimes directly contradicting their previous
statements that were meant to assuage the Bush administration's concerns.16 In addition,
52. See, e.g., H.D.S. Greenway, From Dartb to Diplomat, BosToN GLOBE, May 20, 2005, at A15.
53. See Press Release, Parliamentarians for Global Action, Darfur: International Parliamentary Group Wel-
comes United Nations Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005) And Urges All States To Fully Cooperate
With The International Criminal Court (Apr. 1, 2005), available at http://www.iccnow.org/pressroon/member
mediastatementS/2005/PGA-DARrefOAprO5.pdf (Apr. 1, 2005). Paragraph 6 of the UNSCR 1593 provides
that
nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State outside Sudan which is
not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of that contributing State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to
operations in Sudan established or authorized by the Council or the African Union, unless such exclu-
sive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by that contributing State[.]
See S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 30, 1 6.
54. Press Release, United States Mission to the United Nations, Statement by AmbassadorJames Cunning-
ham, Deputy United States Representative to the United Nations, on the Renewal of Resolution 1422, Security
Council (June 12, 2003), available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/US1422Stmtl2June03.pdf.
55. See AMICC, Advocacy Center, http://www.amicc.org/advocacy.html. U.S. law professor Diane Oren-
thcher, interviewed by National Public Radio stated that the ICC Prosecutor "simply doesn't have the capacity
to go roving around the world issuing indictments at will. He has a limited capacity and the kinds of cases he
takes on are extremely labor-intensive. He only gets involved in situations where extremely serious abuses are
occurring on a massive scale." See Kelemen, supra note 49.
56. William Schulz, Executive Director of Amnesty International USA said at a news conference at the
National Press Club on May 26, 2005 that "'[t]he U.S. government's response to the torture scandal amounts
to a whitewash of senior officials' involvement and responsibility. Those who conducted the abusive interro-
gations must be held to account, but so too must those who schemed to authorize those actions, sometimes
from the comfort of government buildings.'" PoliticalAffairs.net, Amnesty International Calls for International
Investigation of US Torture (May 26, 2005), http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/articleview/I 182/1/97.
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these proponents could not possibly have been unaware, in 2005, that there were several
noteworthy attempts internationally to bring criminal prosecutions against administration
officials for such offenses that fall within the jurisdictional purview of the ICC, as well as
at least one related civil lawsuit." In Spain, for example, on October 19, 2005, Santiago
Pedraz G6mez, judge of the National Court in Madrid, issued arrest warrants for three
U.S. soldiers in connection with the killing of a Spanish journalist on April 8, 2003, when
U.S. forces shelled the Palestine Hotel in Baghdad. Notwithstanding the Pentagon's prior
investigation of the incident, the judge still found it necessary to issue the warrants because
he had received "'no judicial cooperation"' from the United States.5"
In May 2005, activist organizations in the Netherlands attempted to have either a warrant
issued for President Bush's arrest or a court order barring his entry into the country.5 9 The
ground asserted for the warrant was the President's alleged violations of the Geneva Con-
ventions for the killing of innocent Iraqi civilians.6° The judge, however, declined to grant
the requested relief because such an act would "have had 'far reaching consequences for
relations between the Netherlands and the [United States] ... ,"'61
Toward the end of 2004, the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York City, acting
according to principles of universal jurisdiction, 62 filed a criminal complaint in Germany
seeking to hold U.S. officials accountable for war crimes, including Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld. 61 Among the papers submitted was an eleven-page affidavit prepared by
57. Press Release, Human Rights First, ACLU and Human Rights First Sue Defense Secretary Rumnsfeld
Over U.S. Torture Policies (March 1, 2005), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/2005 alerts/
etn0301 _lit.htm; see also Richard Norton-Taylor, International Court Hears Anti-war Claims, THE GuARDiAN,
May 6, 2005, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/lraq/Story/0,2763,1477620,00.html; Thomas Walkom,
Should Canada Indict Bush?, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 16, 2004, at A25.
58. Spain Orders GI. Arrests in Civilians Death, N.Y. TIMES, October 20, 2005, at A12; Democracy Now!
Killing the Witness: Spanish Judge Orders Arrest & Extradition of U.S. Soldiers in Death of SpanishJournalist
Jose Couso in Iraq, (Oct. 20, 2005), http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid = 05/10/20/1410259. On the
incident itself, see Joel Campagna & Rhonda Rounani, Permission to Fire, CPJ (May 27, 2003), http://www.
cpj.org/Briefings/2003/palestine-hotel/palestine-hotel.html (concluding that although the shelling was not
deliberate, it was avoidable). Apropos of this issue, it was reported in November 2005, that George W Bush,
in an April 2004 meeting with Tony Blair, suggested to Blair the idea of bombing the headquarters of the
television network, AI-Jazeera. See Press Release, Committee to Protect Journalists, Bush, Blair Should Set
Record Straight On Leaked AI-Jazeera Threat (Nov. 23, 2005), available at http://www.cpj.org/news/2005/
USA23nov05na.htnl. As of this writing, it is unclear whether President Bush was just kidding.
59. See Court Rules Against Arrest of US President, EXPATICA, May 4, 2005, http://www.expatica.com/source/
site- article.asp?subchannel-id =1 &storyid = 19760&name = Court + rules + against + arrest + of+ US +
President, May 4, 2005.
60. Article 8 of the Rome Statute defines war crimes as including, inter alia, grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949. See Rome Statute, supra note 26.
61. Court Rules Against Arrest, supra note 59.
62. "Universal jurisdiction is the ability of the court of any state to try persons for crimes committed outside
its territory which are not linked to the state by the nationality of the suspect or the victims or by harm to the
state's own national interests." Amnesty International, Universal Jurisdiction, http://amnestyusa.org/inter
national-justice/document.do?id = 99ED2F87B93EEF3980256AF400500062 (lastvisited Feb. 14,2006). Uni-
versal jurisdiction is applicable to "crimes under international law or ordinary crimes of international concern
committed abroad." Id.
63. See Center for Constitutional Rights, CCR Seeks Criminal Investigation in Germany of U.S. Officials
for War Crimes in Abu Ghraib Torture, http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/reports/report.asp?ObjID = TCR1T9TuSb
&Content = 471 (last visited Feb. 13, 2006) [hereinafter CCR Seeks]; see also Center for Constitutional Rights,
Docket: Center For Constitutional Rights Seeks Criminal Investigation in Germany into Culpability of U.S.
Officials in Abu Ghraib Torture, http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/september-l lth/septl 1Article.asp?ObjID =
lxiADJOOQx&Content= 472 (last visited Feb. 13, 2006).
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Scott Horton, professor of law at Columbia Law School and Chair of the International
Law Committee of the New York City Bar Association, in which he propounded a claim
concerning the U.S. federal judicial system that was strikingly similar in thrust to the criti-
cism that U.N. officials had propounded with respect to the Sudanese national court in El
Fasher.M The case, however, was dismissed on February 10, 2005, whereupon the Center
unsuccessfully appealed. 65
Finally, at least two mock tribunals- were also convened by anti-war activist organizations
internationally to call attention to the Bush administration's invasion of Iraq as a prima
facie violation of international law and to denounce the administration's widely reported
(and largely substantiated) use of torture,67 so-called extraordinary renditions,6s and like
practices that have been resoundingly condemned.69
These cases, in essence, were brought by default in a context in which it is generally
acknowledged, even by ICC advocates, that the ICC has not prosecuted (or conducted a
complementarity analysis) and will not likely attempt to bring prosecutions against U.S.
officials if such officials should commit ICC-level crimes.70 But if none of these cases have
succeeded thus far in their respective forums, claims that they ought to succeed, in 2005,
were by no means unthinkable, nor were they necessarily fringe views.71
Hence, one important issue that emerged in 2005, regarding the ICC and the larger
arena of international criminal law, was the provocative question implicit in Scott Horton's
64. Horton wrote that "no such criminal investigation [into allegations of torture] or prosecution [therefore]
would occur in the near future in the United States for the reason that the criminal investigative and prose-
cutorial functions are currently controlled by individuals who are involved in the conspiracy to commit war
crimes." Letter from Scott Horton, Attorney at Law, to An den, Herm Generalbundeseanwalt, regarding
Expert Report of Scott Horton (Jan. 29, 2005), http://www.rav.de/StAR-290105-Horton.htn;seeICC-OTP,
supra notes 39; Rome Statute, supra note 26.
65. The appeal was dismissed on September 13, 2005. See CCR Seeks, supra note 63.
66. See World Tribunal on Iraq, Declaration of Jury of Conscience, http://www.worldtribunal.org/main/
?b= 91; and Bush Crimes Commission, International Commission of Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity
Committed by the Bush Administration-Preliminary Findings Released, http://www.bushcommission.org.
67. THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., Cam-
bridge University Press 2005); Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade (the Taguba
Report), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/iraq/tagubarpt.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2006); see
also Editorial, War Crimes, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2004, at A22.
68. See generally CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE,ToRTURE BY PROXY: INTERNATIONAL AND
DOMESTIC LAW APPLICABLE TO EXTRAORDINARY RENDITIONS, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMITTEE OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION, http://www.nycbar.org/Publications/reports/reports
bycom.php?com= 17.
69. See Horton, supra note 64, 34-35. In this report, Horton highlights the ABA House of Delegates'
condemnation at its annual meeting on August 4, 2005, of the use of torture by the U.S. government, and the
House's demand that the U.S. government "resume compliance with and respect for the Geneva Conventions,
the [Convention Against Torture, and] the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." Id.
70. Nor could the ICC prosecute U.S. officials under the Rome Statute, even through the vehicle of a UN
Security Council referral, see Rome Statute, supra note 26, because the United States may simply exercise its
veto power over any such attempt to make a referral. But see Norton-Taylor, supra note 57 (citing Ocampo as
saying that the cases brought "are potentially significant and that he is treating seriously evidence already
submitted to it.").
71. See, e.g., Press Conference, Statement of Rear Admiral John D. Hutson (Ret. USN) Former Judge
Advocate General of the Navy (Mar. 1, 2005). "The military becomes chaotic without accountability. Only by
enforcing the concept of accountability can we begin healing, redeeming our respect, and repairing our inter-
national reputation. I believe the buck stops at the desk of the Secretary of Defense." Id. Admiral Hutson is of
counsel to Human Rights First in the lawsuit described, supra note 57.
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affidavit in the German case and in the parallel activity of the ICC with respect to Sudan
and the cases discussed in this section: whether criminal prosecutions by international bod-
ies such as the ICC, or an ad hoc tribunal such as the IST, will be pursued against particular
defendants based on either conscious or unconscious considerations of the political power
of the state that is or would be brought within the purview of investigation for violations
of international criminal law. In this sense, Abdul Rahim Muhammad Hussein, the Sudanese
Interior Minister, who is blamed for much of the violence in Darfur, was actually serious,
even though he laughed when questioned about what he would do if indicted by the ICC-
he answered that he would ask Donald Rumsfeld to appear with him for the killing of
hundreds of people in Iraq."
While the very idea that U.S. officials should ever be subject to international criminal
prosecution may strike some observers as disturbing, or even ridiculous, it is the humble
submission of the International Criminal Law Committee that exponents of the rule of law
internationally cannot credibly ignore the danger of double-standards being applied in such
rule. As Scott Horton put it succinctly on a recent radio program, "[i]t cannot be the case
from the U.S. perspective that [prosecutions of political figures] is true for subequatorial
African dictatorships and for the Yugoslavia regime, for the Germans and the Japanese, but
not for the United States. That's not possible.""
72. Jonathan Karl, The Darfur Disaster, THE WKLY. STANDARD, Vol. 10, Issue 31, Apr. 26, 2005, http://
www.sudantribune.com/article.php3 ?id- article = 9253.
73. Democracy Now!, Lawyer Scott Horton: Vice President Cheney Is the Man Who Unleashed Torture and
Promoted It Within Our Military and Our Intelligence Service (Oct. 27, 2005), http://www.democracynow.org/
article.pl?sid = 05/10/27/1451229&mode = thread&tid = 25.
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